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I felt this necessary. Once. Today it's just a bunch of garbage.
Here's a quasi-philosophical musing. Just because.
A man thinks of a friend.
He contemplates what this friend would be doing, where he would be, etc., and comes to a conclusion. The conclusion drawn is an expectation, which the man justifies by experience--the conclusion is justified by experience. He is certain that on this day, his friend is doing this thing, in this place, etc.; in short, he figures a scenario which his friend is very likely to be in.
The man's friend is dead. But he may as well be alive, in terms of the man's thought.
The same man thinks of another friend.
He contemplates what this friend would be doing, where he would be, etc., but cannot come to a conclusion. The two are not strangers, but lacking the experience to justify any expectations, the man decides he can be certain of nothing (save for his uncertainty). There are likelihoods, but what else? On the basis that he does not have the information necessary to create any likely scenario, the man does not imagine any scene. He cannot establish, without experiencing, whether his friend is even alive.
The man's friend is alive. But just as likely to be dead, in terms of the man's thought.
So, here we have a man thinking of two friends, neither of which he is observing--he only thinks of them. By experience, he finds it more likely for the first friend to be alive than the second. If the man were asked the location of the first friend, he would answer with certainty of some specific place. Bear in mind, regardless of his certainty, he would be incorrect. But if asked where to find the second, the only certainty in his answer would be in his clear lack of certainty. One, he'd know to be somewhere, and the other, he'd not know to be anywhere.
Suppose the man wishes to take an impromptu visitation to one of the two, whom he cares for equally:
He will set off toward the first, out of certainty, but find him dead.
If the man cared for his friends equally, why would the death of the first one be more saddening to him than the second? It is the violation of his expectations.
Here's a (confusing, I assure you) scenario:
I pick up $20 from the ground. If I expected to find the money, I wouldn't be as thrilled about it than I would had I not expected the money. Likewise, if I lost $20, but expected that to happen, I wouldn't be as sad as if I had lost $20 and not expected it. And if I expected to lose $20, but didn't lose the money, I would be happier than I would had I neither expected to lose money nor lost any.
Notice the effect changes with the amount of money staying the same. Thus are the effects of fulfilled and unfulfilled expectations, positive or negative. Roughly, at least... but it's an example.
So what, then? I suppose all I'm left to say is that the argument is between experience and expectation. Preconceived notions can either dull pain or dull joy. And the lack of any expectation will enhance pain or enhance joy.
Assume that preconceived notions and the lack of expectation cannot coexist. Which do you choose?
...
Which do I choose? Because there are some days when I want nothing but the explicit, and some days when I'm satisfied with having a good, albeit unfulfilled, dream.
I go in circles between the two. It's lame.
"Existence," as they said, "precedes essence."
There's a conflict, between an existing being and one with nothing but an inherent essence. Writing this out was meant to solve it a little.
 Someone Somewhere Else · Fri Dec 25, 2009 @ 09:36pm · 0 Comments |
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